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Abstract:  According to proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception 
(Hurley & Noë 2003, Noë 2004, O’Regan 2011), active control of camera movement is 
necessary for the emergence of distal attribution in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) 
because it enables the subject to acquire knowledge of the way stimulation in the substituting 
modality varies as a function of self-initiated, bodily action. This chapter, by contrast, 
approaches distal attribution as a solution to a causal inference problem faced by the subject’s 
perceptual systems. Given all of the available endogenous and exogenous evidence available 
to those systems, what is the most probable source of stimulation in the substituting 
modality? From this perspective, active control over the camera’s movements matters for 
rather different reasons. Most importantly, it generates proprioceptive and efference-copy 
based information about the camera’s body-relative position necessary to make use of the 
spatial cues present in the stimulation that the subject receives for purposes of egocentric 
object localization. 
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1. Two Questions about Sensory Substitution 
 
Sensory substitution devices (SSDs) convert images from a video camera into 
patterns of vibrotactile stimulation (White et al. 1970; Bach-y-Rita 1972, 2004), 
electrotactile stimulation (Sampaio et al. 2001, Ptito et al. 2005, Chebat et al. 2011), or 
auditory stimulation (Meijer 1992, Capelle et al. 1998, Renier et al. 2005, Amedi et al. 
2007, Kim & Zatorre 2008) that visually-impaired individuals can use to perform 
tasks ordinarily guided by non-prosthetic vision. An adequate account of how SSDs 
enable trained users to interact with the environment in an adaptive manner must 
answer two main questions. The first question concerns the end-product of the 
learning process in sensory substitution. What kind (or kinds) of representational 
states do properly trained subjects form in response to stimulation in the substituting 
perceptual modality? There are at least five possibilities: 
 
a)  The SSD extends the range of properties represented by the substituting 
modality. The device, for example, enables trained users to perceive the 
shapes and sizes of objects at a distance from their body by means of 
touch. 
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b) The SSD enables trained subjects to perceive properties of the distal 
environment via the substituted modality, i.e., the device to a certain extent 
restores the sense of sight.  
 
c) The SSD enables trained subjects to perceive properties of the distal 
environment via a new prosthetic modality, i.e., the subject enjoys 
experiences that are not straightforwardly in the substituting or 
substituted modality. 
 
d) Trained subjects transform stimulation in the substituting modality into 
accurate visual and/or spatial mental images of surrounding objects and 
their properties. 
 
e) Trained subjects perform quick cognitive inferences from stimulation in the 
substituting modality to properties of the distal environment. 
 
The second question, by contrast, concerns the nature of the learning process itself. 
How do blindfolded, late blind, and early blind subjects respectively learn to use the 
stimulations provided by a given type of SSD for such purposes as object-directed 
motor control, wayfinding, or object recognition? It is on this second question that I 
shall focus primarily in this chapter. 
 
Before proceeding, it should be emphasized that both questions need to be relativized 
not only to the specific type of SSD being deployed, but also to subjects’ history of 
visual impairment, if any. Effective visualization strategies, for example, may be 
available to blindfolded and late blind subjects, but not to subjects who have been 
blind since birth (Poirier et al. 2007). It is also important to keep in mind findings 
concerning the crossmodal plasticity of the visually deafferentated brain. In 
particular, there is extensive evidence that occipital cortex is recruited for tactile and 
auditory processing when it is deprived of its standard sources of retinal input 
(Pascual-Leone & Hamilton 2001, Proulx et al. in press, Kupers et al. 2011, Kupers & 
Ptito 2014). This means that subjects who are blind or undergo prolonged visual 
deprivation may make rather different use of the information conveyed by 
stimulation in the substituting modality than normally sighted subjects. Contrary to 
possibility (b), but in keeping with (a), Kupers et al. (2006) found that, after one week 
of training with an electrotactile tongue display unit, transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) of occipital cortex evoked tactile sensations on the tongues of one 
late blind and three early blind subjects – ‘short-lasting experiences of distinct 
tingling, varying in intensity, extent, and topography depending on the locus of the 
occipital cortex that was stimulated’ (13257) – but only phosphenes in blindfolded 
subjects.1  
                                                
1 This result is consistent with the finding that TMS applied to occipital cortex induces 
experiences of touch that are referred to the fingertips in blind Braille readers (Ptito et al. 
2008a). See Ortiz et al. 2011, however, for evidence that tactile stimulation elicits phosphenes 
in some late blind subjects. 
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Whether or not subjects have previously enjoyed visual experience seems also likely 
to affect how they learn to detect and disambiguate the spatial information present in 
SSD-mediated sensory stimulation. Unlike early blind subjects, blindfolded and late 
blind subjects may be able to exploit various crossmodal correspondences that obtain 
between the substituting modality and vision, for example, the link between tactile 
and visual shape or between auditory frequency and elevation in the visual field 
(Evans & Treisman 2010, Spence 2011). Consistent with this, studies by Kim and 
Zatorre (2008) have found that, prior to any training, blindfolded subjects can 
perform image identification tasks using the vOICE at an above-chance level so long 
as they are given an explicit explanation of the image-to-sound conversion rules. 
 
 
2. Action Movement in Sensory Substitution  
 
In tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS), low-resolution, gray-scale images from a 
video camera are converted by a human machine interface (HMI), pixel by pixel, 
into vibrotactile stimulations on the skin of one’s back. A main finding in early 
experiments conducted by Paul Bach-y-Rita and colleagues was that subjects learned 
to discriminate the spatial layout of the scene in front of them via TVSS only when 
they had active control over movement of the video camera (White et al. 1970, Bach-y-
Rita 1972). Subjects who received visual input passively experienced only a changing 
pattern of tactile stimulation: 
 
When asked to identify static forms with the camera fixed, subjects have a 
very difficult time; but when they are free to turn the camera to explore the 
figures, the discrimination is quickly established. With fixed camera, subjects 
report experiences in terms of feelings on their backs, but when they move the 
camera over the displays, they give reports in terms of externally localized 
objects in front of them (White et al. 1970: 25). 
 
Motivated by this finding, proponents of the sensorimotor contingency theory of 
perception have maintained that passively stimulated subjects do not learn to localize 
objects in surrounding space by means of TVSS because they are unable to master 
the sensorimotor contingencies that govern use of the device. ‘[A]ctive movement’, 
Susan Hurley and Alva Noë write, ‘is required in order for the subject to acquire 
practical knowledge of the change from sensorimotor contingencies characteristic of 
touch to those characteristic of vision and the ability to exploit this change skillfully’ 
(2003:145; also see Noë 2004, Kiverstein 2010, and O’Regan 2011).2 
                                                
2 Sensorimotor contingencies are regularities that govern way moving in relation to the 
surrounding environment gives rise to changes in proximal sensory stimulation. Approaching 
an object, e.g., causes its retinal image to undergo expansion, which, in turn, causes a 
corresponding change in the pattern of retinal stimulation. Moving away from the object has 
the opposite effect. In the modality of touch, squeezing a soft sponge produces a distinctive 
pattern of tactile stimulations in one’s hand. Squeezing a clod of dry clay produces quite 
another. 
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Hurley and Noë make two main claims about TVSS. The first claim is an answer to 
the question concerning the end-product of learning in sensory substitution. They 
argue that TVSS is best understood as a case of cortical deference in which activity 
in a blind subject’s somatosensory cortex takes its ‘qualitative expression’ from the 
character of the externally rerouted visual input that it receives. TVSS, in other words, 
enables blind subjects to perceive the spatial layout of the distal environment in a 
phenomenologically vision-like manner – possibility (b) above. The second claim is 
an answer to the question concerning the nature of the learning process in sensory 
substitution. Subjects learn to make efficient use of TVSS only by acquiring 
knowledge of the sensorimotor contingencies associated with the prosthetic modality. 
‘The distinctively visual character of TVSS-perception stems from the way perceivers 
can acquire and use practical knowledge of the common laws of sensorimotor 
contingency that vision and TVSS-perception share’ (2002:145). 
 
It seems clear that there is significant overlap between the sensorimotor contingencies 
that respectively characterize ordinary, non-prosthetic vision and TVSS. This is 
because the HMI systematically converts the 2D image produced by the video 
camera, pixel by pixel, into a corresponding 2D array of vibrotactile stimulation on 
the skin. In consequence, the effects of camera movements on the structure of the 
former are mirrored by changes in the structure of the latter. Approaching an object, 
for example, causes its image in the camera to loom, which, in turn, causes its size in 
the vibrotactile array (functionally, the prosthetic retina) to increase. Retreating from 
the object causes its image to shrink, which, in turn, causes its size in the vibrotactile 
array to decrease. Panning to the right, causes the object’s image to shift to the left, 
which, in turn, causes a structurally similar change in the pattern of vibrotactile 
stimulation on the skin. And so on. 
 
Psychological and neuroscientific investigations of sensory substitution undertaken in 
the last decade provide reasons to be skeptical about this account. According to 
Hurley and Noë, activity in somatosensory cortex takes its ‘qualitative expression’ in 
TVSS from the character of the externally rerouted visual input that it receives. In 
other words, TVSS-perception is a case of somatosensory cortical deference. The 
TMS studies by Kupers et al. (2006), mentioned above, as well as brain imaging 
studies of cortical activation during visual-to-tactile sensory substitution tasks (for 
reviews, see Kupers et al. 2011, Kupers & Ptito 2014) present a rather different 
picture. In particular, they suggest, first, that in blind subjects occipital cortex is 
recruited to process the somatosensory inputs produced by a visual-to-tactile SSD 
and, second, that the resulting experience is, in at least some respects, 
phenomenologically touch-like in character: ‘Our studies suggest that the qualitative 
character of the subject’s experience is not determined by the area of cortex that is 
active (cortical dominance), but by the source of input to it (cortical deference)’ 
(Kupers & Ptito 2014: 44). As most researchers would readily acknowledge, however, 
there are also salient contrasts between the representational content of TVSS-
perception and the representational content of ordinary touch. Proficient users of 
TVSS, in particular, acquire the ability to discern the geometrical properties and 
locations of objects at a distance from the body in space. In this respect, the 
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representational content of TVSS-perception is akin to that of vision in normally 
sighted subjects.3 
 
 
3. Distal Attribution and Causal Inference  
 
There are also reasons to be skeptical that passively stimulated subjects fail to 
discriminate 3D spatial layout via TVSS because they lack the opportunity to learn 
the sensorimotor contingencies that govern use of the device. An alternative 
explanation is that subjects who do not control the camera’s movement – and who 
are not otherwise attuned to its current position – are simply unable detect and make 
effective use of the spatial information present in the vibrotactile stimulations that they 
receive. In consequence they do not engage in ‘distal attribution’ (Loomis 1982, 
Epstein 1986): they do not attribute the cause of those stimulations to a three-
dimensional scene in the external world.  
 
Evidence that subjects with active control over camera movement do engage in distal 
attribution comes from the earliest experiments on TVSS by Bach-y-Rita and 
colleagues. Trained subjects, e.g., exhibited defensive, startle responses when objects 
loomed in the tactile array (Bach-y-Rita 1972: 98-99) and were spontaneously able to 
make sense of kinetic depth displays: 
 
A modified version of the Metzger apparatus was used, consisting of a 
turntable on which two vertical white rods were mounted. This was rotated 
slowly before the camera and the subjects were asked to describe what they 
‘saw.’ Some sighted subjects, upon first tactile presentation of this moving 
display, have spontaneously described it as moving in depth. Several blind 
subjects were given experience with a yoked pair of turntables. On one of 
these, an object was placed within view of the camera, while the subject 
turned the other freely, experiencing the transformations that the object 
underwent with the rotation. After an hour’s experience with this equipment, 
they could report accurately the eccentric placement of two and three objects 
on the turntable, and could also experience rotation in depth with the 
Metzger display (White et al. 1970: 25).  
 
In keeping with a recently influential Bayesian approach to perception in cognitive 
science (Mamassian et al. 2002, Kerstein & Yuille 2003, Shams & Beierholm 2010, 
Clark 2013, Hohwy 2013, Rescorla forthcoming), it is helpful, I would suggest, to 
think of distal attribution as the solution to a causal inference problem faced by the 
subject’s perceptual systems. Patterns of proximal sensory stimulation significantly 
underdetermine their causal antecedents in the environment (hence, the so-called 
‘inverse optics’ problem for vision). The central challenge faced by any perceptual 
system, on Bayesian models of perception, is to infer the most probable cause of a 
given pattern of proximal sensory stimulation on the basis of (1) the low-level cues 
                                                
3 I’m grateful to Julian Kiverstein for discussion of the TMS studies conducted by Kupers et 
al. 2006. 
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present in the pattern itself, i.e., properties of the pattern that are predictive of 
properties in the environment, and (2) pre-wired or learned assumptions about the 
environment’s statistical structure (the perceptual system’s ‘prior knowledge’ about 
the world).4 The cues constrain the inference process from the bottom-up, while the 
assumptions constrain the process by, among other things, determining which way of 
integrating cues, in context, is statistically optimal (Knill 2007). The content of the 
perceptual state formed in response to a particular pattern of stimulation – the 
brain’s operative ‘hypothesis’ about the structure of the impinging environment – is 
the cause to which the highest probability is assigned given all the available 
endogenous and exogenous evidence. In the case of vision, this will normally be one 
of indefinitely many possible three-dimensional scenes.5 The default hypothesis space 
for causal inference in everyday vision (the space of world states over which the 
posterior distribution is computed) is a distant scene space, in which different hypotheses 
correspond to different possible arrays of objects at a distance from the perceiver’s 
eyes. (One such hypothesis picks out the very scene present in front of the reader 
now.) By contrast, the default hypothesis space for causal inference in everyday touch 
is a contacting object space, in which different hypotheses correspond to different possible 
objects in contact with the surface of the perceiver’s body. Distal attribution in visual-
to-tactile sensory substitution can be predicted to occur, when, from the standpoint of 
the perceiver’s perceptual systems, the most likely environmental cause of incoming 
vibrotactile or electrotactile stimulation – contrary to the default haptic interpretation 
– is a distant scene rather than an object of some sort touching the surface of her 
body.  
 
The question to ask now is: What role does active control of camera movement play 
in enabling such radical re-shaping of the hypothesis space for touch in TVSS? 
 
It is easiest to explain why such re-shaping is unlikely to occur when the subject is 
passively stimulated. When a subject outfitted with a TVSS device lacks control of 
the camera’s movements and is not otherwise able to register its position, all of the 
available endogenous and exogenous evidence is consistent with the default haptic 
interpretation of incoming sensory stimulation: the most likely cause of that 
stimulation is direct, bodily contact with an object of some kind. From a causal 
inference perspective, it is thus unsurprising that she does not learn to perceive 
                                                
4 This is a simplification. Bayesian models often incorporate other kinds of prior world 
knowledge. For discussion, see Geisler 2008. Two further points are important. First, 
perceptual inference is a non-conscious, subpersonal process. It is the perceiver’s brain rather 
than the perceiver herself that is confronting the causal inference problem described here. 
Second, Bayesian models do not assume that perceptual systems explicitly represent either 
the norms of Bayesian decision making or the various forms of prior knowledge imputed to 
them for purposes of explaining the formation of perceptual mental states. Bayesian models 
only assume that perceptual processes typically proceed in accordance with the principles of 
Bayesian decision making (see Burge 2010: 95-97 and Rescorla forthcoming). 
5 Although multistable perceptual experiences can occur in which the selected hypothesis 
alternates from one moment to the next, depending on the allocation of attention and other 
factors. Examples include the flip in depth assignments when viewing a drawing of a Necker 
cube or the reversal in perceived direction of rotation in the silhouette illusion. 
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spatially remote objects and features by means of TVSS. There is simply no reason 
for her perceptual systems to shift away from the hypothesis that the tactile 
stimulations she is receiving have an ordinary tactile cause. In consequence, although 
multiple sources of information about the visible scene are present in those 
stimulations – these derive from monocular cues in the 2D image such as height in 
the visual field, relative size, familiar size, linear perspective, motion parallax, shape-
from-motion, and looming (White et al. 1970, Bach-y-Rita 1972) – the subject’s 
perceptual systems are unable to detect and exploit them. 
 
By contrast, when the subject has the ability to guide and keep track of the camera’s 
movement, she also has a significant amount of voluntary control over whether and 
how the vibrotactile stimulation she experiences undergoes change. In consequence, 
the situation is now one that conflicts with the default haptic interpretation: it is not 
typically possible to modify tactile stimulation on the surface of one’s back by moving 
a camera mounted on a tripod or on one’s head! The observed coupling between 
camera movement and vibrotactile stimulation is evidence that the latter’s cause 
resides outside of the hypothesis space for everyday touch. 
 
In addition to evidence against the default haptic interpretation, there is now also 
additional evidence required for inference to a spatial layout in the hypothesis space 
of vision (or rather what constitutes the hypothesis space of vision in normally sighted 
subjects). To begin with, there are the aforementioned spatial cues present in the 
pattern of vibrotactile stimulation produced by the HMI. In addition, because the 
subject has control over how the camera moves she now also has access to real-time 
information about its body-relative position. This is important because the spatial 
cues present in the vibrotactile stimulation the subject is receiving are sources of 
information about the way objects fill out three-dimensional space in front of the camera. 
Height in the visual field, relative size, motion parallax, looming, etc. are all 
variations in image structure that are predictive of the distances of objects that reflect 
light to the camera’s lens. The HMI in TVSS works by converting these variations in 
image structure into corresponding variations in the structure of the vibrotactile 
array. To engage in causal inference to the way objects fill out space in front of her 
own body – to make use of the cues contained in the stimulation that she receives 
from the HMI as sources of egocentric spatial information – the subject thus needs to 
be able to keep track of the camera’s body-relative position, where it is located, for 
example, relative to her head, or torso, or hand. As Bach-y-Rita writes, ‘In the 
absence of motor control over the orientation of the sensory input, a person may 
have no idea from where the information is coming, and thus no ability to locate [its 
source] in space’ (2004: 90). Another key reason, then, that active control over the 
movements of the camera matters is that it generates information about the camera’s 
body-relative position necessary for causal inference to the way objects are arrayed in 
space at distance from the subject’s body. Such causal inference, on the present 
interpretation, is the essence of distal attribution.  
 
I should emphasize that it is the availability of up-to-date and accurate information 
about how the camera is positioned in relation to the body that is important here, 
rather than the particular way in which the information is generated. In the case of 
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the subject who actively controls the camera’s movements, the information is 
presumably based on proprioceptive signals and efference copy of motor commands 
to move the head or hand (depending, respectively, on whether the camera is 
mounted on a pair of eyeglasses or, as in the earliest experiments, on a tripod). But 
reliable information about body-relative camera position could, in principle, be made 
available in other ways to passively stimulated subjects.6  
 
Siegle & Warren 2010 offer a similar interpretation of the role of self-produced arm 
movements in learning to make distance judgments using a simple visual-to-tactile 
SSD (Figure 1). The device in their experiments consisted of a single photodiode 
mounted on the index finger linked to a vibrating motor worn on the back. The 
motor was active when a subject pointed the photodiode in the direction of a light 
source and inactive otherwise. Subjects outfitted with the device were trained to 
sweep their arm back and forth in order to estimate the egocentric distance of a 
target light, which could be stationed at various locations along a 193-cm track in 
front of them. On Siegle and Warren’s preferred Gibsonian interpretation, action is 
necessary for subjects to perform this task successfully not because it enables them to 
learn the sensorimotor contingencies associated with use of the SSD, but rather ‘to 
reveal invariant information about the distal layout and to dissociate it from varying 
stimulation that depends on self-movement’ (221). According to this ‘invariance 
hypothesis’, action generates proprioceptive information about pointing direction 
(generated by changes in the orientation of the torso and the joint angles of the 
shoulder and elbow), which when combined with the motor signal, is sufficient to 
triangulate the body-relative position of the distal target. Such triangulation, whether 
undertaken explicitly or implicitly, is clearly also available to subjects who control 
camera movement when using more sophisticated visual-to-tactile SSDs. They can 
use information about the camera’s changing, body-relative orientation together with 
concurrent tactile stimulations to confirm that an object is ‘out there’ at a certain 
egocentrically defined distance and direction in space. 
 
 
                                                
6 I am grateful to Fiona Macpherson and David Pence for discussion of this point. 
 
 
Fig. 1 (a) The sensory substitution device used by Siegel & Warren 2010. Photodiode on the 
index finger responds to light from the target, driving a vibrating motor on the subject's 
back. (b) Pattern of arm movements participants were instructed to make when exploring the 
target. Reproduced from Siegel & Warren 2010. 
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The interpretation of the role of active camera control in learning to make use of 
TVSS offered above is a version of the invariance hypothesis. A main reason that 
subjects who control the camera’s movements engage in distal attribution, I have 
argued, is that such control generates reliable information about the camera’s body-
relative position needed to exploit the spatial cues in incoming vibrotactile 
stimulations for purposes of egocentric object localization. Subjects do not need to 
acquire knowledge of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies. 
 
 
4. Bodily Action and Prism Adaptation 
 
The discussion in the last section suggests that we cannot straightforwardly infer from 
the apparent dependence of a given form of perceptual learning on self-produced 
bodily movement to the dependence of that form of learning on knowledge of 
sensorimotor contingencies, i.e., knowledge of the sensory consequences of action. 
Otherwise, we may overlook the Gibsonian possibility that it is not self-produced 
movement per se that makes the crucial difference to the learning process, but rather 
the perceptual or proprioceptive information to which the former gives rise.7 
 
A final example illustrating this point comes from studies of how subjects adapt to 
prisms that reverse, invert, or laterally displace the retinal image (for overviews, see 
Rock 1966, Welch 1978). Richard Held and Alan Hein conducted an influential 
series of experiments in which participants wore laterally displacing prisms during 
either active or passive movement conditions (Held & Hein 1958, Hein & Held 1962, 
Held 1965). In the active movement condition, the subject moved her visible hand 
back and forth along a fixed arc in synchrony with a metronome. In the passive 
movement condition, the subject’s hand was passively moved at the same rate by the 
experimenters. Although the overall pattern of visual stimulation was identical in 
both conditions, adaptation was reported only when subject’s engaged in self-
produced movement. Held and Hein used these findings to defend what in the 
literature has come to be known as the ‘reafference theory’ of adaptation. According 
to the reafference theory, subjects exhibit stable adapt to optical rearrangement only 
when they receive visual feedback from self-produced bodily movement, i.e., 
reafferent visual stimulation.  
 
Contrary to reafference theory, subsequent experiments in the 1960s found that 
adaptation to lateral displacement is not restricted to situations in which subjects 
engage in movements that generate reafferent visual feedback, but can also take 
place when subjects receive visual feedback generated by passive effector or whole-
body movements (Singer & Day 1966, Templeton et al. 1966, Fishkin 1969). 
Evidence was even garnered that prism adaptation is possible in the complete 
absence of motor action (Howard et al. 1965, Kravitz & Wallach 1969). In general, 
the extent to which adaptation occurs seems to depend not on the availability of 
reafferent stimulation from motor actions, as Held proposed, but rather on the 
                                                
7 For useful discussions of this point, see the commentaries on Gyr et al. 1979 and Campos 
2000. 
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presence of either of two related kinds of information concerning ‘the presence and 
nature of the optical rearrangement’ (Welch 1978: 24). Following Welch, I shall refer 
to this alternative to the reafference theory as the information hypothesis. 
 
One source of such information concerns the veridical directions of objects from the 
observer (Rock 1966; chapters 2-4). Normally, when engaging in forward 
locomotion, the apparent radial direction of an object straight ahead of the body 
remains constant, while the apparent radial directions of objects to either side 
undergo change. This pattern also obtains when the observer wears prisms that 
displace the retinal image to side. Hence, as Rock writes, ‘an object seen through 
prisms which retains the same radial direction as we approach must be seen to be 
moving in toward the sagittal plane’ (1966: 105). On Rock’s view, at least some forms 
of prism adaptation can be explained by our ability to detect and exploit such stable 
sources of spatial information in locomotion-generated patterns of optic flow.  
 
Another more effective source of information for prism adaptation is the registered 
discrepancy between seen and proprioceptively experienced limb position (Wallach 
1968). Proponents of the information hypothesis have found that, when this conflict 
is made conspicuous, passively moved (Melamed et al. 1973), involuntarily moved 
(Mather & Lackner 1975), and even immobile subjects (Kravitz & Wallach 1966) 
exhibit significant adaption. Although active bodily movement is unnecessary for 
adaptation to occur, it provides subjects with especially salient and precise 
information about the discrepancy between sight and touch (Moulden 1971): subjects 
are able proprioceptively to determine the location of a moving limb much more 
accurately than a stationary or passively moved limb.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Sources of evidence for the information hypothesis discussed above indicate that 
adaptation to displacing prisms can occur in the absence of self-produced movement. 
The information hypothesis, however, predicts that action will facilitate adaptation 
when it generates information either about the world (in particular, the real radial 
directions of objects from the perceiver) or about the perceiver’s body (in particular, 
the real positions of her limbs) that conflicts with the way things look as a result of 
prismatic displacement. ‘According to this view’, Rock writes, ‘[active] movement is 
important only because it allows for certain kinds of information to be registered, not 
because movement per se is necessary’ (1966: 42).  
 
In this chapter, my aim has been to show that something analogous holds true of the 
learning process in tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS). In particular, I have 
argued that active control over camera movement facilitates distal attribution in 
TVSS not because it enables subjects to master the laws of sensorimotor contingency 
governing use of the device, but rather because it generates proprioceptive and 
efference-copy based information about the camera’s changing body-relative 
position. Such information is important to the emergence of distal attribution for two 
main reasons. First, without knowledge that the vibrotactile stimulations she is 
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receiving can be modified by camera movement, the subject’s perceptual systems 
have no reason to budge from the default haptic interpretation of those stimulations. 
The coupling between changes in camera position and changes in sensory 
stimulation is evidence that the cause of the latter resides outside the ordinary 
hypothesis space for touch. Second, having the ability to keep track of the camera’s 
body-relative position enables the subject to exploit the spatial cues present in 
vibrotactile stimulation for causal inference to the egocentrically specified distances 
and directions of objects in space around her. Such causal inference, on the 
interpretation I have defended here, is the basis of distal attribution.8 
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